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TILE COMPLIANCE OFFICER CONUNDRUM:
ASSESSING PRIVILEGE ISSUES IN A
HEALTH CARE SETTING
GregRadinsky*

A BACKGROUND OF OIG'S COMPLIANCE
OUTREACH EFFORTS
In 1997, Inspector General June Gibbs Brown invited the nation's health
care community to join her in a national campaign to eliminate fraud and
abuse from the federal health care programs.1 The Inspector General
advocated a two-pronged approach, built on a strong enforcement effort
and on efforts to encourage voluntary compliance with the law.2 The
Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human
Services (OIG) stressed that it wanted to develop a working relationship
with the industry to try to resolve fraud and waste problems instead of
only relying on enforcement efforts.3
*Mr. Radinsky is currently attending the Kellogg School of Management. He was formerly
an Associate Counsel in the Office of Counsel to the Inspector General, Health and Human
Services, Washington, D.C. He was responsible for coordinating Global Settlements, False Claims
Act litigation and settlements, and qui tam litigation. In addition, Mr. Radinsky worked on legal
matters that pertained to the Physicians at Teaching Hospitals (PATH) initiative, home health
agencies, and skilled nursing facilities. The views expressed in this Article are solely those of the
author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Office of the Inspector General, Health
and Human Services, or the United States Government.
I June Gibbs Brown, An Open Letter to Health Care Providers, Office of the Inspector
General
1 (Feb. 1997), http://www.hhs.gov/progorgloig/modcomp/Itrhcp.html [hereinafter
Brown, Open Letter (Feb. 1997)].
2
1d.
3
1d. See also June Gibbs Brown, An Open Letter to Health Care Providers,Office of the
Inspector General (Mar. 9, 2000), http:lwwv.hhs.gov/progorgloig/Modcomp/openletter.htn-l
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Only a few years ago, health care "compliance" was a new buzzword.
Today, compliance is an expected industry standard. Over the past few
years, the health care community has taken affirmative steps toward
promoting a high level of ethical and lawful corporate conduct by
developing and implementing compliance programs.4 Accordingly, the
design of a health care provider's internal operating structure has changed.
The demand for corporate compliance in the health industry has resulted
in the creation of compliance officer positions to oversee compliance
efforts. At numerous conferences, the OIG and Department of Justice
stressed that providers need to develop an "effective" compliance
program, and not one that exists merely for the purpose of trying to cover
up existing or potential violations of the law.' In that regard, selecting the
right person as compliance officer is a key factor in ensuring that a
program will be effective-6
SELECTING YOUR COMPLIANCE OFFICER
The OIG recommends that the compliance officer be a member of senior
management and that he/she be able to directly report to the Chief
Executive Officer and the Board of Directors.7 The OIG also recommends
that the position of compliance officer be free standing and not combined
with any other key management positions such as general counsel,
comptroller, or chief financial officer.8 Nonetheless, several health care
[hereinafter Brown, Open Letter (Mar. 9, 2000)].
4
For example, the American Hospital Association (AHA) recently reported that 96% of
surveyed hospitals either had a compliance program in effect or were planning to initiate one in
1999. See American Hospital Association, Compliance Survey (1999), http://wxvw.aha.org (64%
of hospitals currently have compliance programs, and 32% plan to initiate one in coming year).
See Brown, Open Letter (Mar. 9, 2000), supra note 3.
5
See Office of the Inspector General (OIG), Compliance Guidancefor Hospitals (Feb.
1998), http://www.hhs.gov/progorg/oig/modcomp/hospital.pdf [hereinafter OIG Compliance
Guidefor Hospitals]. See also Videotape: A.B.A. Health Law Update 2000 (on file with the
American Bar Association).
6
See OIG Compliance Guide for Hospitals,supra note 5. See also Federal Sentencing
Guidelines Manual § 8A1.2(k)(2) [hereinafter U.S.S.G].
7
See OIG Compliance Guidancefor Hospitals, supra note 5.
8
See id. The OIG does recognize that every organization has a different culture with its own
inherent problems. Although the OIG recommends that the compliance officer be a freestanding
function, it understands the need for providers to tailor their compliance program to their own
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corporations have charged their in-house attorneys with the task of setting
up compliance programs and resolving related issues. In some cases,
corporations have actually named their in-house counsel as the compliance
officer. This practice has sparked an ongoing debate.
Some corporations prefer having this "dual role" arrangement for
several reasons. They may select an in-house counsel as compliance
officer because of cost considerations. Others may have done so because
they feel the in-house attorney is the most knowledgeable about the federal
health care program requirements and how their business can comply with
them. And some corporations may believe that having an in-house
attorney take a proactive role in the corporation's compliance affairs will
better protect the corporation and promote overall compliance within
itself.
However, the OIG believes that when a free standing compliance
function exists, it helps to ensure independent and objective financial
analyses of the corporation's compliance efforts.9 The OIG believes that
adding the compliance officer function to a key management position with
other significant duties can compromise the goals of the compliance
program.'0 For example, a general counsel's foremost concern may be
protecting the corporation from prosecution, not rooting out long term
fraud. Furthermore, the corporation takes the risk of having its
compliance officer/in-house attorney being called as a fact witness during
litigation. A corporation may feel uncomfortable having its in-house
attorney disclose information about the client's compliance functions
during litigation. The loss of attorney-client privilege when the attorney
acts in the role of compliance officer could cause a chilling effect on the
relationship between counsel and management. Moreover, the dual roles
will make it difficult for the corporate counsel to maintain objectivity
when providing advice about the deficiencies of the compliance program
he/she oversees. The compliance officer/in-house counsel's loss of
objectivity may occur so subtly that the individual does not notice it. As
individual needs. See id. at 4-5. For a further discussion on the selection and retention of a
qualified compliance officer, see Howard Young, Preventing Compliance Programsfrom
Becoming a Victim oftheir Own Success, J. HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE, May-June 2000.
9
See 0IG Compliance Guidancefor Hospitals,supra note 5.
1
OSeeid. at 7-8.
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a result, a corporation may not receive sound legal advice in determining
whether it has any administrative, civil or criminal liability.
SELF-DISCLOSURE TO THE GOVENPAEIf'A

T

To better understand why it is important for the compliance officer
position to be separate from the corporate counsel position, it is important
to understand the duties and responsibilities of the compliance officer. The
compliance officer should be responsible for developing and
implementing policies, procedures, and practices designed to ensure
compliance with federal health care program requirements." An essential
step toward establishing an effective compliance program is for the
compliance officer to administer periodic audits to gauge the corporation's
current level of compliance.'" During this process, a corporation may
uncover that its coding, billing, and other applicable practices constitute
a violation of law.' 3 The Inspector General has encouraged corporations
to come forward to the government voluntarily when they uncover
evidence of fraudulent conduct within their organization. 4 The number
of providers self-disclosing potentially abusive conduct to the OIG has
increased dramatically over the past year and it is expected that these
numbers will only continue to increase.'"

11

See U.S.S.G., supra note 6. See also 0IG Compliance Guidefor Hospitals,supra note

5, at7.
12
See
13

id.
See Larry J. Goldberg, OIG PerspectiveIssues Should Be Prioritizedin an Internal
Investigation, J.HEALTH CARE COMPLIANCE July-August 1999 (discussing how investigations
should be conducted to appropriately discover and correct billing problems).
14
Office of the Inspector General, ProviderSelf-DisclosureProtocol,63 Fed. Reg. 58,399
(Oct. 30, 1998). See also Press Release, OIG Issues Guidanceon Voluntary DisclosureofHealth
Care Fraud(Oct. 21, 1998); Brown, Open Letter (Mar. 9, 2000), supra note 3; Brown, Open
Letter (Feb. 1997), supra note 1. According to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, a corporation may
have to turn over the investigative report to the government in order to receive benefits under the
Corporate Compliance Guidelines. See U.S.S.G., supra note 6, at § 8C2.5(g).
15
Over 70 health care providers have self-disclosed potentially fraudulent conduct to the
OIG which has resulted in millions of dollars already having been returned to the Medicare Trust
Fund. See Brown, Open Letter (Mar. 9, 2000), supra note 3.
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RESPONDING TO INVESTIGATORY SUBPOENAS
Despite providers' compliance efforts, the government plans to continue
to crack down on providers who flagrantly disregard the federal health
care programs' requirements.16 However, the terrain in which the
government will need to excavate now may have a few more rocks and
bumps. Because the government often relies upon the documents it
receives pursuant to investigatory subpoenas in developing a False Claims
Act 7 or Civil Monetary Penalty" action against a provider, the issue of a
corporation's attorney also serving as compliance officer becomes even
more precarious.' 9
When a health care corporation receives a subpoena, it will need to
evaluate whether it is appropriate to claim privilege on many of the
16

See Greg Radinsky, How Health CareAttorneys Can Discern Vernon, SuccessorLiability
and Settlement Issues, 44 ST. Louis U. L.J. 113, 114-117 (Winter 2000) (discussing the
government's initiative to minimize fraud, waste, and abuse in the federal health care programs).
17
Congress enacted the civil False Claims Act, also known as the "Lincoln Law," to deter
and detect "rampant fraud" in federal defense contracting during the Civil War. S. Rep. No.
99-345, at 7 (1986), reprintedin 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5285-86 (explaining the history of the
False Claims Act). The False Claims Act was significantly amended in 1986 to combat all forms
of government procurement and contracting fraud, including fraud with respect to the federal
health care programs. See generally S. Rep. No. 99-345. The False Claims Act prohibits the
knowing filing of a false or fraudulent claim for payment to the United States, and the knowing
use of a false record or statement to obtain payment. Persons violating these provisions of the
statute are subject to civil penalties of not less than $5,000 and not more than $10,000, plus treble
damages, for each such claim filed. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
18
The Civil Monetary Penalties Law, enacted in 1981 and modeled on the Civil False
Claims Act, authorizes the imposition of civil penalties on providers who defraud the Medicare
or Medicaid programs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The False Claims
Act and the Civil Monetary Penalties Law only impose penalties on those who "knowingly"
participate in the wrongdoing. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729(a)-(b) (1994); 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320a-7a (1994
& Supp. II 1997) (law regarding Civil Monetary Penalties). The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) clarified the standard of knowledge required to impose liability under
the Civil Monetary Penalties Law by adding "knowingly" before "presents," see HIPAA § 23 1(d),
110 Stat. at 2013, and by defining the term "should know" to encompass acting with "deliberate
ignorance or reckless disregard" of the truth or falsity of the claims submitted. Id. HIPAA also
expressly included "no proof of specific intent to defraud is required." Id. at 2014. This language
reflects the same standard of knowledge required for False Claims Act violations.
19
The Inspector General Act, 5 U.S.C. § 6(a)(4), authorizes each inspector general: "to
require by subpoena the production of all information, documents, reports, answers, records,
accounts, papers, and other data and documentary evidence necessary in the performance of the
functions assigned by this Act."
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responsive compliance documents. In assessing each document, the health
care entity will need to determine the nature of the in-house counsel's role
to decide whether he/she was acting as an "attorney" at the time of the
communication and thus, whether the communications and/or documents
from the investigation are privileged. The role of an attorney as
investigator, auditor, or compliance officer may take the attorney outside
the role of "legal counsel" and therefore, outside the protections of the
attorney-client and work-product privileges.
In some cases, the corporation may already be under a Corporate
Integrity Agreement (CIA).2" Under the CIA, the government has the
authority to examine the provider's books, records and other supporting
materials as well as conduct on-site reviews of the provider for the purpose
of verifying and evaluating the provider's compliance with the terms of
the CIA and compliance with the requirements of the federal health care
programs.21 However, a corporation's status under the CIA should neither
change how it assesses privilege issues nor how the government views
these issues. The government will need to review the provider's
compliance policies, hotline complaint log, and other compliance
materials in order to assess the effectiveness of the provider's compliance
program and whether the provider complied with the terms of its CIA. If
the corporation appropriately set up its compliance program, these
compliance documents should not include privileged communications
20

A CIA is an agreement entered into between a health care provider and the government
in conjunction with a civil settlement related to a fraud and abuse investigation. It is a government
imposed plan, usually entered into as an alternative to other administrative remedies, such as
exclusion from the federal health care programs. See Criteriafor Implementing Permissive
Exclusion Authority under Section 1128(b)(7) of the Social Security Act, 62 Fed. Reg. 67,392,
67,393. CIAs are different from compliance programs. Compliance programs are programs
voluntarily designed and implemented by health care providers. They are not government
imposed. There are no absolute requirements as to what elements, structure or resources should
be incorporated into a voluntarily created compliance plan. However, if the government as part
of its investigation examines a compliance plan, proof of its effectiveness by the provider may be
a key factor in its acceptability as a mitigating factor. Id. at 67,393-94. See generally OIG
Compliance Guide for Hospitals, supra note 5; Office of the Inspector General, Compliance
Guidancefor ClinicalLaboratories(Aug. 1998); Office of the Inspector General, Compliance
Guidance for Home Health Care Agencies (Aug. 1998); Office of the Inspector General,
Compliance Program Guidance, available at http://www.dhhs.gov/progorg/oig (containing
materials developed by the OIG as part of its effort to identify and curb health care fraud).
21
See Corporate Integrity Agreements (on file with author).

2002]

ASSESSING PRIVILEGE ISSUES INA HEALTH CARE SETTING

because compliance documents are routine business documents.22 If a
corporation decides to cloak many of these compliance documents as
privileged, it will be a red flag to the government to further examine the
corporation's compliance program to ensure that the corporation is not
trying to conceal any illicit conduct. Thus, it is recommended that a
corporation provide as many non-privileged documents to the government
as possible in order for the government to effectively assess the
corporation's compliance with the federal health care programs
requirements. As noted earlier, the government will not tolerate
compliance programs designed to cover up existing or potential violations
of law. Likewise, the government would likely view the attempted
withholding of non-privileged documents negatively.
EVALUATING ATTORNEY-CLIENT AND
WORK PRODUCT PRIVILEGES
Federal courts have the authority to recognize the attorney-client, attorney
work product and other privileges pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 3 In the seminal decision of Upjohn v. UnitedStates,
the Supreme Court upheld the attorney-client privilege in a health care
compliance setting.24 Although the court did not establish any specific
rules governing the application of privilege in the corporate setting, it did
consider the following factors:
1) the communications were made by employees to
corporate counsel who were acting as such for purposes of
22

See infra notes.
FED. R. EviD. 501. This article does not address the self-evaluative privilege because this
privilege is generally not applicable in federal enforcement actions. See United States ex rel.
Falsetti v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 915 F. Supp. 308 (N.D. Fla. 1996). See also Thomas F.
O'Neil III & Adam H. Chames, The Embryonic Self-Evaluative Privilege:A Primerfor Health
Care Lawyers,
5 ANNALS OF HEALTH LAW 33, 39 (1996).
24
Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). An in-depth discussion of the
corporate attorney-client privilege is outside the scope of this article. For a thorough discussion
of the corporate attorney-client privilege, see Vincent C. Alexander, The CorporateAttorneyClient Privilege:A Study of the Participants,63 ST. JOHN'S L. Rv. 191 (1989) and John E.
Sexton, A Post-Upjohn Considerationof the CorporateAttorney-Client Privilege,57 N.Y.U. L.
Rev. 443 (1982).
2 3
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rendering legal advice to the corporation;
2) the communications by the employees were made at the
specific direction of their corporate superiors;
3) the communications concerned matters within the scope
of the employees' corporate duties;
4) the communications were made by the employees who
were made sufficiently aware that they were being questioned
by attorneys for the purposes of allowing the corporation to
receive legal advice; and
5) the communications were at all times treated as highly
confidential when made and thereafter kept confidential by
the company.
If any of these elements are not met, a court may determine that the
attorney-client privilege does not apply and the communications would be
subject to discovery. Even though the Supreme Court did not set forth a
bright-line test for evaluating the corporate attorney-client privilege,
attorneys should look to the Upjohn factors in evaluating privilege issues.
Legal professionals often misconceive that they can automatically
assert the attorney-client privilege if a document has been through the
hands of an attorney. 26 A provider should not arbitrarily designate all
documents collected, interviews conducted or facts gathered as falling
within a privilege. Reports of compliance audits, meetings, and corporate
25

See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 394-95. For a widely cited formulation of the elements of the
attorney-client privilege, see United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59
(1950) (stating that in order for the attorney-client privilege to apply the communication must meet
the following requirements:
(1) [T]he asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2)
the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar
of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication
is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii)
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.)
26
SeeIn re Grand Jury Subpoena v. United States, 599 F.2d 504, 511-12 (2d Cir. 1979)
(stating that the participation of corporation's general counsel does not automatically cloak an
internal corporate investigation with legal garb so as to be subject to attorney-client privilege).
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compliance committee notes sent to an attorney to keep him/her generally
informed cannot be deemed privileged." Also, copying or making a
lawyer a recipient of existing documents does not make the document
subject to the attorney-client privilege and immune from disclosure.28
Likewise, the mere presence of an attorney at a meeting does not render
discussion notes privileged unless they reflect communications made to
obtain an attorney's advice."
Some attorneys also do not fully understand the attorney work
product doctrine. In the seminal decision Hickman v. Taylor, the Supreme
Court recognized the attorney work product privilege." The attorney work
27

See Simon v. G.D. Searle & Co., 816 F.2d 397,402-04 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
917 (1987) (holding risk management documents prepared by nonlawyer corporate officials in an
attempt to keep track of, to control, and to anticipate costs of product liability litigation for
business-planning purposes were not privileged); First Wisconsin Mortgage Trust v. First
Wisconsin Corp., 86 F.R.D. 160, 174 (E.D. Wis. 1980) (stating the attorney-client privilege
protects only communications pertaining to legal assistance and advice and does not extend to
business advice given by an attorney to a client, or to intra-client communications designed to
communicate only business or technical data); Gould Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co. Ltd.,
825 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1987) (stating documents received by attorney from clients which
would not be privileged if they remained in the clients' hands would not acquire protection merely
because they were transferred to the law firm); Coulton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633, 639 (2d
Cir. 1962) (holding that preexisting documents and financial records not prepared by clients for
purpose of communicating with their attorneys in confidence have no special protection under
attomey-client privilege because turned over to an attorney).
28
See United States Postal Service v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corporation, 852 F.Supp. 156
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (declaring the mere fact that communication is made directly to attorney, or
attorney is copied on a memorandum, does not mean that communication is necessarily privileged
under attorney-client privilege). See also In re Feldberg, 862 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating a
corporation may not use the expedient of a lawyer to shield documents from grand jury
subpoenas); Gould, Inc. v. Mitsui Mining & Smelting Co., 825 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1987) (declaring
preexisting documents that were not prepared for the purpose of obtaining legal advice do not
become invested with the privilege by tendering them to a lawyer).
29
Duttle v. Bandler & Kass, 127 F.R.D. 46,52 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Scott Paper Co.
v. Ceilcote Co., Inc. 103 F.R.D. 591, 594 (D. Me. 1984) (stating the mere fact an attorney located
a particular document while preparing for litigation does not make the document "work product"
protection is limited to items obtained or produced by the lawyer which involved his professional
skill and experience).
30
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, which codified the attorney work product privilege, states:
[a] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable...and prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for
another party or by for that other party's representative (including the other
party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon
showing that the party seeking discovery has a substantial need of the
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product privilege differs from the attorney-client privilege in that it
focuses on encouraging careful and thorough preparation by the lawyer
instead of focusing on encouraging the client to communicate freely with
the attorney. 1
The doctrine, codified in Rule 26(b)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, protects a lawyer's research, analysis, legal theories, mental
impressions, and notes and memoranda of witnesses' statements, prepared
"in anticipation of litigation or for trial," from disclosure to opposing
counsel. 32 Rule 26 does not require that the work product have been
prepared by an attorney to be protected; the rule makes specific reference
to the "party's representative (including the ... attorney, consultant, surety,
indemnitor, insurer, or agent). 33
Work product can take one of two forms: (1) "opinion work product,"
which, in the language of Rule 26(b)(3), consists of the attorney's "mental
impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories"; and (2) "ordinary
work product" or "factual work product," which consists of all other
materials developed in anticipation of trial. 34 "Opinion work product" is
protected against disclosure, while "ordinary work product" is protected
unless the adversary can demonstrate some necessity or justification for
obtaining the materials, such as the unavailability of the information
through normal discovery devices.35
'
The Federal Rules do not define "in anticipation of litigation."36
Accordingly, attorneys sometimes misinterpret how broadly this definition
can extend. Courts have decided that certain types of documents would
not qualify for immunity. The mere likelihood of litigation in the future
materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable
without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials
by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials when the required
showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the
mental impression, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or
other representative concerning the litigation.
31
Hickman, 329 U.S. at 510. The Supreme Court held that "in performing duties.. .it is
essential that a lawyer work with a certain degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by
opposing parties and their counsel." Id.
32
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
33
See id.
341d.
351d.
361d.
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is insufficient for invoking the privilege.37 The probability of litigation
must be substantial and the commencement of the litigation imminent.38
Also, courts have held that documents that are prepared for a purpose
other than litigation are discoverable.39 For all these reasons, routine
compliance documents such as monthly audits, compliance policies and
training materials should not be claimed as work product.40 Furthermore,
ordinary investigations that a health care corporation conducts into a
billing matter may not be accorded work product protection even if there
Some courts have even made
is a small likelihood of litigation.'
investigative documents discoverable on the ground that there was a
business purpose separate and distinct from the prospect of possible
litigation.42
Accordingly, attorneys need to carefully assess compliance
documents before asserting the work product privilege. When evaluating
documents in the health care setting, certain precautionary steps can be
37

See, e.g., Stauffer Chemical Co. v. Monsanto Co., 623 F. Supp. 148, 227 (E.D. Mo.
1985); National Tank Co. v. Brotherton, 851 S.W.2d 193, 203 (Tex. 1993).
3
8See Stauffer, 623 F.Supp. at 227.
39
See, e.g., Scott Paper Co. v. Ceilote Co., 103 F.RD. 591, 596 (D.C. Me. 1984) (holding
that opinion letters regarding whether the sale of shares without SEC registration might result in
liability were prepared as a routine business procedure and were not prepared in contemplation of
litigation); Janicker v. George Washington Univ., 94 F.R.D. 648, 650-5 1(D.D.C. 1982) (stating
that the fact that a party may anticipate the contingency of litigation resulting from an event does
not automatically qualify an in-house report as work product).
40
See Scott, 103 F.R.D. at 596. See also Janicker,94 F.R.D. at 650-5 1.
4
1See, e.g., Garfinkle v. Arcata Nat'l Corp., 64 F.R.D. 688, 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (holding
an attorney's notes of a meeting to discuss a business problem were not prepared in anticipation
of litigation because the court found the purpose of the meeting was to prevent a business dispute
from leading to legal action); Hardy v. N.Y. News, Inc., 114 F.R.D. 633, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
("[t]he fact that documents prepared for a business purpose were also determined to be of potential
use in pending litigation does not turn these documents into work product or confidential
communications between the client and attorney"); United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530,
543-44 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 944 (1984) (holding a tax pool analysis, which is
designed to set forth contingent tax liability of a corporation, was not work product because its
primary function was to comply with business requirements, even though there was a possibility
that litigation with the IRS might result).
42
See, e.g., Janicker,94 F.R.D. at 650 (stating a "more or less routine investigation of a
possibly resistible claim is not sufficient to immunize an investigative report developed in the
ordinary course of business"); SEC v. Nat'l Student Mktg. Corp., 1974 WL 439 *8-9 (D.D.C Aug.
23, 1974) (holding that some memoranda prepared by SEC staff in the course of an investigation
of defendants were not in anticipation of litigation if they were prepared during the time the
agency collected and evaluated factual documents).
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taken in advance to prepare a corporation to consistently and appropriately
claim privilege on legal documents that may overlap with business and
regulatory functions.
THE DOCUMENT SELECTION PROCESS
As noted above, it is important for the compliance officer position to be
separate from the corporate counsel position.43 However, business reasons
may cause a corporation to combine the functions. In that event, it is
imperative for the corporation to document why it has chosen to utilize its
general counsel to also serve as its compliance officer. This can help the
federal government better understand the corporation's selection decision.
Moreover, if any privilege disputes ever arise, it will help a court better
understand the corporation's decision-making process.
Differentiate Between Underlying Facts
and Communications to and from Attorneys
When an employee communicates facts to an attorney (in-house counsel
or outside counsel), the communication, including the facts as stated in the
communication, is privileged." The reason for this application of the
privilege is that "sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and
that such advice or advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully
informed by the client. ' s However, the attorney-client privilege protects
only communications between client and attorney, and does not shield
facts underlying the communications.46 Thus, the employee can be
questioned about the facts themselves, but she cannot be asked what she
wrote to the attorney, nor can her communication to the attorney be
obtained.47 Of course, the advice from the attorney is also privileged.
43

See Janicker,94 F.R.D. at 650.
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; UnitedShoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. at 359.
45
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
46
See id. See also WLIG-TV, Inc. v. Cablevision Sys. Corp., 879 F. Supp. 229, 233
(E.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating "[t]he attomey-client privilege protects communications between a client
and an attorney but does not shield facts underlying the communications"); In re Minebea Co.,
Ltd., 143 F.R.D. 494, 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating "[t]he privilege attaches only to the
communication between the attorney and client, not to the underlying facts or information").
47
See Upjohn, 443 U.S. at 395-96. For example, in the Upjohn case, the corporation's
attorneys sent a questionnaire to its foreign managers seeking detailed information concerning
44
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Employees Should Differentiate Between
Legal vs. Non-Legal Advice
Depending upon the nature of each corporation's operating structure, the
compliance department or individual needs to be clear when it seeks legal
advice from the corporation's legal department. Courts have consistently
ruled that the attorney-client privilege only attaches to legal, and not
business services.
For example, compliance training materials,
compliance quizzes, monthly compliance audits, hotline complaint
telephone log, compliance policies and procedures are compliance
documents and not legal in nature. Even if the corporation's attorney
made some general comments on some of these documents, the attorney's
notes may not be deemed privileged by a court.49 Courts have held legal
advice may not be privileged if it is merely incidental to the business, such
as compliance advice.5 °
questionable payments to foreign government officials. Id. The Supreme Court held that the
filled-in questionnaires were privileged because they supplied information to the attorneys so that
legal advice could be given. Id. However, the employees could be questioned by an adversary
about the facts underlying the responses to the questionnaires. Id. They could not be questioned
about the contents of the questionnaires. Id.
48See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's of London, 676
N.Y.S.2d 727, 730 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1998) (stating the communication itself must have been
primarily or predominately of a legal character); North Am. Mortgage Investors v. First Wisconsin
Nat'l Bank, 69 F.R.D. 9, 11 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (stating "[flor privilege to exist, the lawyer must not
only be functioning as an advisor, but the advice given must be predominately legal, as opposed
to business, in nature. Thus, when a lawyer who authored a document had been acting primarily
as a bank's loan officer and not as legal counsel, the court held that the bank failed to meet its
burden of establishing the applicability of the privilege").
49
See, e.g., United States v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206,212-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)
(stating legal advice may not be privileged if it is merely incidental to the business advice); Hardy,
114 F.R.D. at 643-44 (stating "[W]hen the ultimate corporate decision is based on both a business
policy and a legal evaluation, the business aspects of the decision are not protected simply because
legal considerations are also involved").
50
See Hardy, 114 F.R.D. at 643-44. However, at least one court has applied a broad view
as to what constitutes legal advice vhen an attorney gave advice on an uncommon business matter.
See United States Postal Service v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., 852 F.Supp. 156, 160 (E.D.N.Y.
1994) (stating "because the transaction was not a routine business matter and required considerable
involvement with a state regulatory agency, it is clear that the subject matter was one of particular
concern to the client and an area where the expectation of confidentiality arguably is greater.
Thus, in situations where advice is rendered or sought to seem to touch upon sensitive issues, I
have taken a broad view of legal advice in applying the privilege, in recognition of the unique role
that an attorney brings to bear in imparting advice that may incidentally also involve business
advice.")
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A court may deem the communication legal only if the corporation
can show that the communication "would not have been made but for the
corporation's need for legal advice or services."51 For example, formal
legal opinions, communications regarding litigation strategy and
interviews of witnesses for potential litigation would constitute such
advice. Conversely, communications made by or to attorneys for purposes
of making business recommendations would constitute business advice.
To prevent any discrepancies, the compliance officer/in-house attorney
should clearly identify herself as an attorney in all appropriate legal
communications.
Also, when a corporation evaluates an internal compliance audit, it
needs to focus on the purpose of the audit. The corporation will likely
conduct frequent audits to evaluate its billing system as part of its
compliance program. This audit is part of the corporation's daily business
function and should not qualify either as attorney work product or
attorney-client privilege.5 2
CONCLUSION
If the history of the OIG's efforts to curtail fraud and abuse is an indication
of the future, health care entities should plan to have an effective
compliance program in place. For any program to be successful it must
have at the helm, someone whose main focus is compliance. There are no
mandated regulations on a corporation's selection of a compliance officer.
However, as we have seen, it is much simpler to select a person whose
sole responsibility is compliance than to set up a "dual role" situation.
Specifically, adding compliance duties to the general counsel creates a
situation that is not ideal. Since the general counsel's main role is to
protect the company it can create a paradox for the person because the
purpose of a compliance program is to uncover problems and address
them, not to minimize the company's liability. The realm of compliance
can be quite intricate, so why risk complicating the situation by
jeopardizing privileges?
51
See First
52

See id.

Chicago Int'l y.United Exchange Co., Ltd., 125 F.R.D. 55, 57 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).

